LITIGATORS' ETHICS
MICHAEL E. TIGAR °

I'm going to talk about litigators' ethics from the standpoint of a litigator
who works primarily in the criminal courts. No doubt some of you came here
thinking that litigators' ethics is an oxymoron, like "defense budget" or
"military intelligence." I don't think that's true, and maybe I'll convince you
of it. I will tell you to begin with that I am going to honor William James's
statement that some people say they are thinking when they are simply
rearranging their prejudices. I'm going to rearrange some of my prejudices
for you today and talk from experience.
I was provoked to consider my subject by some recent events. Nineteen
ninety-eight was a banner year in Texas and a banner year for legal ethics. It
was a year in which the state bar of Texas proceeded at a cost of several
million dollars against a plaintiff's lawyer for allegedly unlawfully soliciting
clients in the wake of an aircrash-a U.S. Airways plane that crashed in South
Carolina. They were unsuccessful. That is to say, the jury found that John
O'Quinn hadn't done anything wrong, and no discipline was imposed. And
yet, as I say, the bar literally spent millions of dollars to bring this case-to
hold this plaintiff's lawyer up as an example of everything you shouldn't do.
That is, you shouldn't go to the scene of an accident, where insurance
investigators are already thick on the ground, and offer people legal
representation. But also in 1998, the state bar did nothing-zero--about the
representation provided in capital cases that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals managed to affirm, even though the court-appointed lawyers for these
defendants had slept during much of the trials in which their clients were
found guilty and sentenced to death. That is, I think, an unfortunately all-tootypical look at the exercise of discretion by the bar in legal ethics cases.
I'm not going to say much about the technicalities of this world of legal
ethics. Of course, you must learn all of those rules, but there are some times
when a hand held before your eye can obscure the vision of distant mountains.
And it's important, I think, to raise our sights a little bit and to look at where
we ought to be as members of a learned profession. And so I begin, but only
by way of introduction, with the ordinary rules of professional responsibility,
what you learn about in the required law school courses-the Model Rules.
Some of these rules reflect, of course, deep-seated values of the profession.
Some have historical antecedents which we can identify; because they are so
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deeply rooted, we can't realistically urge that we simply wipe the books clean
and start over. Some-perhaps many-perform useful functions.
I think the ethical standards about the litigation process protect at least
three kinds of interests. The first thing they do is protect the profession's
monopoly on the provision of legal services. That's not all to the good. We
understand the process by which the common-law lawyers-the lawyers in
England who were members of the common-law bar-achieved a position that
was central to the operation of English society. After all, the English
Revolution in the 1640s saw the abolition of prerogative courts-courts
created by royal fiat-and a tremendous shift of power in the direction of the
common-law courts and, therefore, to common-law lawyers. This process had
already begun in the 1500s and early 1600s as these lawyers became
responsible for all the conveyancing under the drastically revised Tudor land
law. The common-law lawyers and courts also became responsible for
English contract law. The 1602 decision in Slade's Case' customarily marks
this shift in business away from merchant courts and to common-law courts
in commercial contract cases.
So we understand where the profession's monopoly comes from.
Unfortunately, that monopoly is all too often enforced to deny legal services
to people who need them. The early history of the Selective Service Law
Reporter provides an example. In 1967, as a result of congressional
legislation and our increasing involvement in Vietnam, tens of thousands of
young men faced induction into military service based on the decisions of
local draft board members, who were not lawyers. The body of regulatory law
administered by those draft boards was complex, difficult, and largely
inaccessible, and so we published this law reporter to make that law visible.
We had to threaten to sue to get some of the regulatory material out in
public-the Selective Service system claimed for a time that its own
regulations were secret.
Most lawyers in America were not equipped to advise young men about
their rights and options under the draft laws. They had no experience in the
technical regulations governing such things as becoming a conscientious
objector, understanding what it meant to get a student deferment, or satisfying
the requirements for the ministerial exemption. Yet, these legal questions lay
at the heart of young men's personal dilemmas about the war and raised
serious constitutional issues.
There simply weren't lawyers who were doing this kind of law. So we
turned to nonlawyer draft counselors. Some of these folks, who became quite
adept at understanding the regulations, were in church organizations that
advised young men about conscientious objection. Some were affiliated with
colleges. In response, conservative elements in the bar attempted to shut
down these operations on the grounds that they were engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law. However, this attempt was simply the
1.
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manipulation of a legal rule that denied young men any access whatever to the
sorts of information that they needed in order to help them through this
difficult time in their lives. This example is but one instance among many of
bar groups' seeking to enforce the profession's monopoly in ways that deny
ordinary people access to information about their rights.
The second task of the rules of professional responsibility is to protect the
client. It used to be, and around the turn of the century it was, that the rules
expressly stated that the lawyer's obligation to the client in litigation was to
represent the client with warm zeal. Now, in the latest incarnation of the
rules, the words "warm zeal" are dropped out. Instead, Model Rule 3.1 says
(in essence) "we really mean warm zeal, but we talk about professionalism
and competence and so on because we are afraid that if we say warm zeal,
people will think that means you need to be a zealot on behalf of your client,
and nobody likes zealots." So in the name of softening up the rules and
softening up the image of the profession, the warm zeals are a threatened
species. They are clubbing the warm zeals to death to make coats for rich
people. I think that's what's happening.
Whether it's that or some other thing, warm zeal has become endangered.
It is almost embarrassing now to speak these words-that we will represent
our clients with warm zeal, which at times means that we as lawyers must
rebuke judges who want to override what our clients are doing. And so a rule
designed to protect clients has, in the hands of the people who make these
rules for our profession, been watered down to a degree. I see young lawyers
out there who are hesitant to confront judges, who are hesitant to confront
their opposition in the way that they need to in order to defend their clients.
Yet whom do we celebrate in the profession when we look to our history?
We celebrate those advocates who have the courage to speak truth to power.
We celebrate Erskine, who stood up to his former tutor Justice Buller. In a
celebrated seditious libel case, the jury found the defendant "guilty of
publishing only."'2 The word "only" meant that the verdict could not be
construed as finding the defendant
guilty. So Erskine demanded that the
"word 'only' be recorded." 3 Justice Buller ordered Erskine, "[S]it down, or
I shall be obliged to interpose in some other way."4 To that threat Erskine
replied, "I stand here as advocate for a brother citizen, and I demand that the
word 'only' be recorded. Your lordship may interpose in any manner you
think fit. I know my duty as well as your lordship knows his." 5
We also celebrate John Philpot Curran, the great Irish advocate of the
nineteenth century, when English judges presided in Ireland over trials of Irish
dissidents. After some colloquy back and forth, the English judge finally
leaned over and purportedly said, "Mr. Curran, if you persist in that, sir, I

2.
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shall be compelled to commit you for contempt." And Curran rocked back
and adjusted his wig and said, "Ah, then your lordship and I will both have the
satisfaction of knowing it won't be the worst thing your lordship has ever
committed."
So, whether it is with a hint of humor or with a stance of confrontation,
warm zeal is a part of the tradition of our profession, and the rules are
supposed to protect it. And in these times when critics hammer vigorous
advocacy, we must resist all such moves to hold back our duty to speak truth
to power.
The third thing the rules of professional responsibility are designed to
protect is the tribunal-the process. That is to say, we owe candor to the
tribunal. This obligation is enforced by the rules. Now, I certainly do not
quarrel with our duty of candor. Indeed, even when I take an attitude of
skepticism towards one or more of the formal rules, I recognize that we must
all obey them. With respect to this particular rule, I am impressed by the
mounting evidence that prosecutors in high profile cases routinely lie and
conceal exculpatory evidence, and that little is done about it. It is not the rule
that is at fault, but the uneven application of it.
That said, we should understand that many of these rules often have their
origin in the desire to protect only one part of the profession and only one part
of American society and to prevent lawyers from serving as advocates for
other parts. One example is the early hostility to and outright forbidding of
contingent fees. These arrangements were opposed by the organized bar even
though study after study after study had shown that the contingent fee was the
only way that talented lawyers could be drawn into the marketplace to
represent people who have been injured by defective products or by other
corporate or governmental activity. Moreover, a Justice Department study in
1972 reflected that the highest level of satisfaction among consumers of legal
services was found in areas where the contingent fee brought out lawyer
talent. And yet politicians and segments of the bar still rail against it.
Similarly, under the bar rules, there are restrictions on the solicitation of
clients. We know from studying the history of the civil rights movement that
all over the South the NAACP's efforts during its early days to attract clients
to bring test cases were shut down by state bar associations. These bar
associations and the state agencies that supported their aims sued the NAACP
and its lawyers and threatened them with disbarment. Why? Because they
were "soliciting" clients. They were informing people about some alternative
to the injustice under which they lived. It took courageous lawyers to stand
up to that sort of threat and to keep the struggle going until the Supreme Court
finally ruled in their favor.'
The fault did not lie only with the bar groups in the South. In 1912, the
American Bar Association discovered to its horror that three AfricanAmericans had become members. I guess you didn't have to send in a picture
6.
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with~your application and your dues. The ABA wrote these lawyers a letter
telling them to get out of the organization. It wasn't until the 1940s that the
American Bar Association received African-American lawyers into its ranks.
These are examples of how far behind the curve the organized bar has been.
And so I will insist throughout this talk that while these rules of
professional responsibility must guide our conduct in the sense that we must
obey them at our peril, they certainly do not provide for us a full
understanding or a full expression of what we, as lawyers with moral
compasses, must do when making the decisions we must make about where
to take our professional lives. These rules were made by, and in many cases
in the interest of, a small and powerful group in the profession with an agenda
that is not at all congenial to the interest of the broad mass of people.
Susan Carle, my colleague at Washington College of Law, has written
about the way in which some high profile lawyers in the years between 1900
and 1930 were willing to risk professional discipline in order to move the
profession.7 But these were lawyers who, despite their eminence and
prominence, were willing to say, "We know the rule prohibits solicitation, but
let's see if we can do it anyway and stretch the meaning of the rules." Some
of the lawyers were willing, quite frankly, to ignore the rules. Early leaders
of the NAACP-that is to say, prominent white lawyers in the North-thought
that they were relatively immune from being proceeded against under these
bar rules, so they went out and acted in ways that might very well have
subjected lawyers in another part of town to punishment.
Let me give you another example of the milieu in which people operated.
As late as the 1930s, the ABA Ethics Committee said that lawyers could not
represent an organization of farmers because the representation of the
organization was essentially equivalent to soliciting the business of the
group's members by encouraging them to bring lawsuits about their particular
problems.' So, you couldn't be the lawyer for the Grange-an organization
of farmers hit hard by the depression. And yet in that same year, the Ethics
Committee opined that a trade association could retain lawyers to bring
lawsuits against the New Deal legislation because somehow that was
The Committee essentially took the position that these
different.9
"businessmen" simply wouldn't know how else to challenge the Wagner Act
in order to keep unions off their property and that they were ignorant of their
rights and had no affordable access to legal counsel other than through the
association.
To continue a little bit on this theme-that even rules with which we
agree get enforced in the oddest way-please forgive me a story. Dominic
Gentile is a lawyer in Las Vegas, Nevada. He has an excellent reputation. He

7. Susan Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Race, Class and Legal Ethics in the Early
NAACP (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
8. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 169 (1937).
9. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 168 (1937).
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taught at the National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers. He is a good
lawyer. He had a client in Las Vegas named Grady Sanders who owned one
of these places where you can store your stuff. The Las Vegas police used a
storage locker there to store narcotics and money that they were using in a
sting operation. The narcotics and money went missing, and for a year the
police and prosecutors issued press statements and arranged leaks to the press
saying that Grady Sanders stole the money and the drugs and that he was the
guilty party.
After a year, of course, the inevitable happened, and Sanders was formally
charged with having stolen the money and drugs. The night before the
arraignment, Dominic read all the cases on lawyer speech. He went to court
and obtained a trial date six months into the future. He went back to his office
and held one and only one press conference. At that conference, he said, in
so many words, "I will tell you what I believe the evidence will show. The
evidence will show that a Las Vegas police officer took the money and put the
dope up his nose."' 0 Six months later the case was tried. No juror
remembered that press conference, so it could not have had an effect on the
process. Thejury acquitted Grady Sanders because, indeed, there is evidence
that the police officer put the dope up his nose.
One week later, Dominic Gentile got a letter from the state bar, initiating
disciplinary proceedings for having held his press conference." Now,
Dominic's a courageous man. He went through the process, and he got a
private reprimand letter. He could have forgotten about it, but he said, "I'm
not taking it." He called on me and my former partner Sam Buffone, and we
said, "All right, we'll represent you for free. Let's petition for certiorari." We
got certiorari. We did research, and we could not find a single case in which
a prosecutor had been disciplined by a bar for holding a press
conference-except one. We found a case in which a former assistant district
attorney in a New Jersey county spoke with the press following the reversal
of a murder conviction in a case he had tried.' He told a newspaper that the
case shouldn't be retried because there wasn't anything to be gained by it. For
this, the District Attorney referred him to the bar, which disciplined him. 3
That was the only case we could find. As to the merits on the question of
lawyer speech, you can read Gentile v. State BarofNevada. As I was arguing
before the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor leaned over and in a typically
probing question said (and I'm paraphrasing here), "Mr. Tigar, don't all the
state bars have rules that are identical to this one?"'14 I said, "Yes, they do.

10.
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It's one of the Model Rules."'" She said, "Well, what about that?"' 6 I said,
"Well, Justice O'Connor, one of these days-I hope it's today-the state bars
will learn that the First Amendment does not stop short of their door."' 7 And
five justices agreed that that rule was invalid, although a different majority of
five imposed certain restrictions on lawyers' speech in connection with
pending cases.' s
The point is not to reargue the Gentile case. It's to point out that these
rules have a chilling effect on certain kinds of lawyer activity and that they are
enforced in a discriminatory way-despite the fact that lawyers, in addition
to being lawyers, are, after all, public citizens. You learned in Criminal
Procedure, I hope, about writs of assistance-those terrible things that the
British troops used to break down the doors of colonial merchants-and how
in 1761 James Otis; the great Boston lawyer, stood in the Boston Common
and made a speech against such things."' Of that speech, John Adams later
wrote, "Then and there the child Independence was born." Also referring to
that speech and others like it, John Adams wrote home to Abigail from
Philadelphia on July 3, 1776, saying in so many words, "You know, my dear
wife, tomorrow Tom Jefferson and I and some of the other boys"-they were
all boys, we understand that--"are going to do something here in
Philadelphia, and it's going to make some news. But it takes me back to the
time when we had that 1761 deal, and I was leaking stuff to the press."2 John
Adams himself, second President of the United States, was a lawyer, and
somebody in his office leaked stuff to the press about the bad tactics of the
British. And why? Because he understood that, as I said to the Supreme
Court, the public's business can be done in more than one forum at once. And
who is better qualified to comment on the implication of things that are
happening in the courthouse than the lawyers who are deeply involved in it?

15. Id.
16. Id. at *8.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1082.
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in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123-34 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)
[hereinafter LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS].
20. See Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (July 3, 1776), in THE BOOK OF
ABIGAILAND JOHN 138-40 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1975); LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS,
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To silence that voice is to silence an important participant in the debate.
Against this backdrop, we can see how these rules of professional
responsibility may legitimately be said to guide our conduct. They do so in
the sense that Oliver Wendell Holmes, the great legal realist, spoke of the
"bad man" theory of the law' That is, the law of ethics in its narrow sense
dictates only what a bad person would be required to do in order to avoid
punishment. This is the function of the formal rules. And once we put the
rules of professional responsibility into that context, we can begin to ask
ourselves the really important question: What should and must I do in order
to live an ethical life, personally and professionally?
I've established that the rules tell us how we must act. I've established
that I think that the rules are sometimes silly and sometimes enforced in a bad
way. But I haven't addressed how we choose our cases and how we choose
our tactics within those cases. In preparing for this talk, I started reading the
literature (and there's a lot of it lately) written by people-good-hearted
people-who want to attack the sort of thing that I like to do--that is,
defending people accused of crime. These critics raised some of the old
questions, such as, "How can you represent people you know or think are
guilty and be a party to turning them loose?" And others go on to ask, "How
could you possibly cross-examine a witness effectively, even brutally, when
you really know that that witness is, or might be, telling the truth?"
Of course, the traditional answer has to do with the role of lawyers in the
adversary system. I've seen a lot of this literature, and so I wanted to talk a
little bit about it because I'm sure that in your day-to-day activity working in
the clinic or thinking about working on cases you wonder sometimes, "What
role am I suppose to be playing here?" Well, I'll give you a little hint of
where this is headed. I think that it is right and good to represent people
accused of crime. I want to talk about the way in which we choose our cases
and the way we should represent our clients. I am going to reject out of hand
the counsel of those such as Charles Fried, who wrote an article on "The
Lawyer as Friend. 2 2 Fried was Ronald Reagan's Solicitor General. He
taught, I think, at Harvard, and then he must have taught in England. His
tenure as Solicitor General represented the intense politicization of what had
theretofore been an office noted for its political independence. I was sorry for
that. A few weeks ago, Fried was at a conference, one of my colleagues
reported, at which he once again defended the idea that some lawyers will see
the wisdom of being in the middle of those great decisions by which society
is moved-by which he means lawyers in white-shoe law firms on Wall
Street. And some lawyers, he is reported to have said, will be like those who
fix toasters.
I'm going to speak to you as a toaster fixer. I think the idea that a

21. See THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 161-63 (Richard Posner ed.) (1992).
22. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the LawyerClient Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
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satisfying legal career can be carved out by being a friend to the powerful is
not one that I personally go for, although you may wish to. I would warn you
this-that when Fried describes the practice of the big law firms and their
partners of becoming friends of the powerful, he's not really talking about
friends. He's talking about becoming a flatterer of the powerful. And a
flatterer is not your friend, as James Boyd White has pointed out.2" He's your
enemy because he tells you how you can do what you would like to do with
no thought to the consequences of doing it and, therefore, with no warning
about what might befall you if you don't think as well about what you ought
to do.
I confess another part of my bias. Maybe it's suggested by what I said
about judging a case. I represented a man named John Demjanjuk who was
charged with being Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka in a lawsuit filed by the
government in 1977. He was denaturalized. He was deported. He was
extradited to Israel where he stood trial for being Ivan the Terrible and was
sentenced to death. He spent seven and one half years in a death cell in Israel
before, during, and after his trial. It was discovered that, in fact, he was not
Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka and, moreover, that the government had
known-had had evidence in its hands-that he was not, but had deliberately
kept that evidence from its adversary and from the court. And so a panel of
the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Lively joined by Judges Merritt and
Keith, held that the Justice Department had defrauded the courts of the United
States, and by inference, the courts of Israel. 4
After all of that litigation, not one Justice Department lawyer was
disciplined. Not one unfavorable word went on their records, even though
they had put Mr. Demjanjuk at the risk of death. Now these prosecutors are
starting all over again, saying that if he wasn't Ivan the Terrible he was
certainly Ivan the Very Annoying. They will attempt once again to revoke his
citizenship and put him through all that business after twenty-two years in
litigation.
We all know from reading United States Supreme Court decisions such
as McCleskey v. Kemp that, although the system of prosecutorial discretion
that chooses the candidates for the death penalty is shot through with racism
in county after county across the American South and the North, there is
almost nothing you can do to litigate that issue when representing someone in
a capital case. That's what the Supreme Court said. As Justice Brennan said
in dissent, "That would be too much justice."26
We also know that in the Wayte case27 the Supreme Court essentially said,

23. See James Boyd White, The Ethics ofArgument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern
Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 849, 875 (1983).
24. 10 F.3d 338 (1993).
25. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
26. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
27. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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"Well, we don't really get in the way of prosecutorial discretion based on the
exercise of First Amendment activity." Now, think about that for a minute.
You know from your Criminal Law course that only a small percentage of
criminal activity is ever prosecuted and that of the cases that are prosecuted,
ninety percent result in guilty pleas based on plea bargains. Why are only a
small percentage of cases prosecuted in the first place? Because prosecutors
must exercise discretion. In a lot of cases, prosecutors believe that pre-trial
diversion, a warning, or a civil sanction will suffice. Other justifications are
that prosecutors' offices don't have adequate resources or that they have other
priorities in their offices. These seem to be benign kinds of discretion. But
nobody apologizes for the fact that prosecutors have this enormous and largely
unreviewable power to decide who's injail, who's not, under what conditions,
and charged with what. And yet we are reading in the work of very good law
professors, and even clinical teachers, that those of us on the defense side
must engage in a rigorous self-examination and be subject somehow to public
criticism based on our exercise of discretion concerning who we represent and
the kinds of tactics that we use. My answer to that is, of course, that this
Supreme Court line of cases, which insulates prosecutorial discretion from
review, is wrong.
Maybe we will achieve some understanding of the limits of discretion in
the wake of Kenneth Starr's activity. The Supreme Court decided in
Morrison v. Olson2" that the special prosecutor system did not violate the
separation of powers, even though special prosecutors are subject to none of
the institutional constraints-such as they are-to which Justice Department
prosecutors are subject. We know that the Justice Department doesn't
discipline many people, but at least you know they have their people over
there that look at cases and say, "Maybe we should stop now." I don't think
there are very many of those people. Maybe they're an endangered species,
but they provide some constraints and controls. And although judges are
involved in selecting cases and supervising grand juries, Morrison v. Olson
gives judges the kind of power that, arguably, judges shouldn't have. As I
say, in the wake of the Starr business, which I don't propose to debate here,
there may very well be another look at prosecutorial discretion. But it doesn't
look likely that something like that is going to happen, or that it's going to
result in some thorough-going change in the process.
Maybe we could forgive it of the prosecutors, saying as Chesterton said
of the English judges, "They're not cruel, they just get used to things."29 I
don't know. But surely we defense lawyers, facing these attacks and this
unchecked prosecutorial discretion, need to ask ourselves: what is it we're
doing and why do we do it?
Now some of this questioning we can do based on what David Luban has

28. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
29. See STEPHEN, supra note 4.
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called "role-based morality."3 I would not call it role-based morality, I would
call it role-based activity. When I was representing John Demjanjuk, Alan
Dershowitz and Monroe Freedman wrote essays asking me why I was doing
it. "He's not worth your time," they said.3 "He's a terrible person. He's a
Nazi. He's a criminal. He might have killed all these people, and so he
shouldn't have a lawyer. At least he shouldn't have you as his lawyer." In
response, I could have invoked the time-honored canons of ethics-the rules
of professional responsibility. And, of course, I did so because they're
important in that respect. Every person charged with a crime has not just
some abstract right but a constitutional right to counsel. Lawyers, under Rule
6.2, have the obligation to accept court appointments. So, if I'm appointed by
the court to represent someone charged with a serious crime, I really don't
have any problem now do I?
And, of course, I can read the rules like 3.1 and say that I can still do that
with warm zeal. So I'm permitted to say to anyone who wants to criticize
what I do, "Excuse me, I am immune from any official sanction for being a
lawyer." And when you think about it and think about the role of lawyers in
the justice system, my role-based activity as a lawyer should be immune from
public criticism. And I do say that. But you know, I don't think it's enough.
We can read all we want about the great lawyers of this century who have
defended that principle-and it's an important principle to defend. But that
really doesn't answer how we choose our cases and how we choose our tactics
within those cases. It doesn't tell us anything about how to behave. I debated
this with Monroe Freedman, and I said that there are two aspects to this. First,
don't tell me that I need to make a public justification for representing
someone in a criminal case, particularly an appointed case. Don't tell me that,
because once we start down that road, we set in motion the criticism of
lawyers for taking on these cases. We make the lawyer the focus, and there
is already too much of that. The kind of attack we endured during the Nichols
case from the press in Oklahoma is, for example, plenty proof of that.32 No,
Monroe, we need to defend that line. But at the same time I do acknowledge
a responsibility to myself and to my profession to have a reason for acting as
I do. It's simply that you shouldn't be telling me that I'm obliged to make that
into a kind of public defense because when you impose that obligation, you
weaken that shield that we need in order to do our job.
Now does that make you uncomfortable-that you're going to have some
dialogue within yourself and maybe with your colleagues, and you're not

30. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988).
31. See generally Monroe Freedman, Must You Be a Devil 'sAdvocate?, LEGAL TIMES,
Aug. 23, 1994, at 19; Alan M. Dershowitz, On Demjanjuk, UnprecedentedLawlessness, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 5,1993, at A12.
32. The author represented Terry Nichols during his trial for the bombing ofthe federal
building in Oklahoma City. See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 336 (1999).
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going to have to justify yourself publicly? It doesn't make me particularly
uncomfortable. Prosecutors do it all the time. It's an accepted fact of life that
prosecutors exercise this enormous discretion having to do with people's lives
and liberty, and the formal rules say that they are not accountable for it. And
yet I hope that no one would suggest for a minute that if you choose to be a
prosecutor you can act as though you're kind of an amoral being, and the
consequences of the terrible decisions you make aren't really anybody's
responsibility because you were just doing your job. "I was just following
orders. I was just doing my job." That sort of stuff went out at Nuremberg.
So I do have a means of choosing cases. I do have a means of choosing
tactics within cases, and I was thinking about how could I express this-how
could I talk about it. After all, there are people like Professor Alfieri, who
says (in so many words), "Look, you shouldn't cross-examine someone if
doing so reinforces certain social stereotypes about people. You have to be
a sensitive cross-examiner. It doesn't matter that you're doing it to try to get
the jury convinced to come around to your side. You've really got to think
about all these other things."33
And then there's an article by my good friend, Stephen Lubet.34 It's an
article that asks the question, suppose Atticus Finch's client was guilty. We
all remember-I hope we do-the story of To Kill A Mockingbird. It's often
performed as a play. It's a great novel. It was a movie with Gregory Peck.
Here is Atticus Finch-the lawyer in a little town who is appointed to
represent an African-American charged with the rape of a white woman. And
in the end the client is convicted, commits suicide-maybe killed by the
deputies, we don't know. But there is the community in that little southern
town at a time before Coker v. Georgia,3 when to be convicted of rape in the
South carried the death penalty.
Lubet wants us to imagine-suppose the defendant really did it. Would
we then applaud his vigorous cross-examination of the complaining witness?
Would we then applaud Atticus's summation in which he suggested to the
jury that the social circumstances in which she found herself had brought her
to lie under oath? Would we applaud the African-American looking on the
court proceedings, in a segregated courtroom to be sure, who says to Scout,
"Stand up, your father's passin"'? Would we do that? And I say, "Hell, yes."
Walk with me. Let's look at that. Let's ask ourselves. Let's put ourselves in
it.
First, I will tell you that if you brought me a rape case today, I probably
wouldn't defend it if I had a choice. An appointed case would be different.
Why? Because if I could go all through my life without having to crossexamine the victim of a rape, I would feel better for it. I do other kinds of

33.
34.
35.
conviction

See Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1293 (1998).
See Steven Lubet, ReconstructingAtticus Finch, 97 MicH. L. REv. 1339 (1999).
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that the imposition of a death sentence upon
of the crime of rape violates the Eighth Amendment).
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cases. I don't know why this particular distinction gets to me. I would also
find it difficult to represent someone charged with major league heroin
distribution. Other people will do it. There's plenty of money in it. There's
nothing wrong with it, but those are just preferences that I have. You can
attack me for my asserted inconsistency, but there it is.
What about Atticus Finch? Well, he's in a southern town. He's taken a
case that, one would imagine, would not get a fair hearing-an AfricanAmerican confronting the justice system in a southern town with an all white
jury. And yet the need to have that kind of dialogue, to have that kind of
confrontation is very great. How are we going to change the South? By
talking to people? No, it's easier to act yourself into right thinking than to
think yourself into right acting. Also, we remember in the words of the old
prayer, "God give me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the
courage to change the things I can." So, I'm a lawyer. I'm Atticus Finch. I'm
in this town. I understand that racism is pandemic. I see it everyday as I walk.
I see it in people's attitudes. I see it in the way they refer to each other. I see
it in the segregation of the courthouse. And I also know (and this, by the way,
would be enough for me) that in the law of the South there are many, many
cases-and you can read them--developing the law of attempt relating to the
selection of defendants. Let's take law of attempt first.
There are so many cases in which African-Americans are convicted and
sent away for attempted rape, for loitering, and for looking at white women.
The law of criminal attempt in the South suffered so much from that strained
definition of what constituted an attempt. Hell, they were well ahead of the
Model Penal Code in relaxing the limit, saying that mere preparation would
be enough. We also know that in the South, although a lot of forcible or
nonconsensual sex went on, alleged nonconsensual sex involving an AfricanAmerican male and a white woman was far more likely to be proceeded
against than any other kind, especially alleged nonconsensual sex between a
white man and an African-American woman. We also know that, since it's
pre-Cokerv. Georgia, if you're convicted ofnonconsensual sex with a white
woman and you're an African-American, you are sentenced to death and
executed, unless they pull you out of the jail and lynch you first.
And so I'll start by saying that if I'm Atticus Finch in that town, and I
recognize that this is where it is, and I believe the things that he has been
represented as believing, I would try that lawsuit, if only to try to save that
young man's life. If only for that, I would do it. I would try it also because
I think it's necessary at times to confront a system. I would try it to have the
opportunity to give that summation-to try to lead those jurors from the place
where they were to a place where they could see a different vision of a just
society. That's what we do as lawyers. You know, to take a minute or two
and just talk about things.
A lot of times in cases, we're forced to go to a jury and talk to them about
things that are counterintuitive to them-things that they really don't want to
believe-and then ask them to do things that they really might not want or be
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inclined to do. And so in the Nichols case,36 for example, I talked about
needing a place to stand. Here we are in the penalty phase. I said, "You
know, I really want to talk to you because there are different places you can
stand to look at this. I'd like to help us get to a place where you could see that
with the centuries of the world and the decades of our liberty piled so high,
there could be a different way to do things than to respond to all the cries for
vengeance that have filled this room these three days past." I told them the
story of Joseph-cast into a pit by his brothers, left there to die, sold into
slavery, becoming great in Pharaoh's house-who meets his brothers again a
couple of chapters later. I won't go through the whole thing. You know the
scene. He sends everyone out of the room and concludes by saying, "for I am
Joseph, your brother," and sees to it that they have food even though they had
left him for dead. I said, "That's why in the other part of the case I stood
behind Terry Nichols and said, 'This is my brother."' I hoped the jurors
didn't resent it. I wanted them to keep in mind that there is another place to
stand other than vengeance.
And so, yes, in the Atticus Finch case, that's the decision I would make.
And now I get rebuked. Someone will say.to me, "Aren't you just playing
God? Aren't you just making up your own mind how it should be?" Well, I
reject the playing God idea. That's just sophistry. What I think I'm saying is
that we all-have the obligation to make decisions as moral individuals. That's
just a value judgment. Well, it is a value judgment, but it's not just a value
judgment.
One of the terrible things about law school, I think, is that very little that
happens in most law schools prepares you to listen or to care. As our dean
jokingly says, "Eighty percent of the people who come to this law school say
they want to become lawyers because they're interested in social justice. We
get that down to about twenty percent by the time they get through here. We
beat that out of them." Well, that's not true, but a lot of what happens in
traditional legal education in the first year asks you to focus on legal rules.
Can you ever remember raising your hand and saying, "Wait a minute. That's
just not fair"? And then the professor goes into the Socratic dance and goes
round and round, and you learn the value of the rule and the perils of
indulging exceptions-forgetting, I think, in the process that the structure of
the law has got so many open spaces and so much discretion that the
discretionary area in which officialdom and the lawyers for people operate is
just so much greater than the paradigm suggests. So the answer is, you will
be compelled to act in ways that affect people and to do so without any formal
rules that require you to act in one way or another.
I've already shown you that as a prosecutor, you'll process case after case
and make your decisions. As a defense lawyer, you will decide to crossexamine this witness or not to cross-examine, or to be harsh or to be gentle,
36. See United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
336 (1999); see also Michael E. Tigar, Defending: An Essay, 74 TEX. L. REV. 101 (1995)

2000]

LITIGA TORS' ETHICS

or to say this or to say that, or to counsel this client about what he ought to do
as opposed to what he's able to do (as Sir Thomas More put it in his talk with
his successor as Lord Chancellor). And very little in legal education (except,
by the way, clinic education) prepares you to make those kinds of
decisions-to exercise that kind ofjudgment. And yet, I tell you as surely as
we're sitting here that it will be what you will do every day of your
professional life. And so the time is now to say, not that this is just a value
judgment, but to ask yourself, "how will I make those valuejudgments? How
did I make it in the case of Atticus Finch? Whether you agree or disagree with
me or not, how did I make it?"
To begin, a lawyer stands in a certain point in history. So our first
requirement is that we understand history-that we understand where we
stand. A lawyer understands the social system of which he or she is a part.
A lawyer understands certain kinds of claims for justice made by a client. An
opportunity to stand at the center by which all things are moved is given us
only because some poor soul needs justice. And based on our understanding
of those things-that is to say, historically validated norms and ideas about
how justice is, can be, and must be-we can make decisions about what our
priorities are in particular cases. We live in a world in which the selfconscious formulation of norms about justice has proceeded at a pace that
would amaze those of two or three generations ago.
Can I prove it? On September 21, 1976, on the streets of Washington,
D.C., a bomb planted on the orders of President Pinochet of Chile killed
Salvador Allende's foreign minister, Orlando Letelier-the former
ambassador to the United States-and his associate, Ronni Karpen Moffitt.
My partner Sam Buffone and I sued the Chilean junta. We got ajudgment for
four million dollars. Eventually we collected. But-and we knew this-the
Pinochet regime in Chile from 1973 to 1990 had been responsible for more
than four thousand disappearances and innumerable tortures. That's a part of
reinforcing what that regime did. It was refreshing to see that there have been
developed in the last generation international norms that say that that sort of
conduct not only is wrong, but can be punished. That is, we are not without
guidance in thinking about what you need for a just society. There's been a
universal declaration of human rights, there are conventions on torture,
conventions on the rights of the child. These are the historical moments in
which we stand. We can make decisions about what role we want to play in
formulating claims for justice and we can do something about it.
And then last October Pinochet gets arrested. Remember that? In
England. And people said, "Ah, some crazy Spanish private prosecutor has
gone and seen to the arrest of a former head of state." So with my wife and
law students from Washington College of Law, I helped the British barristers
who were supporting extradition. We went to London and worked on the
briefs for four days. The next thing you know the House of Lords says, "Oh,
he's not immune from a lot of that." And then a couple of weeks ago, Sam
Buffone and I went to London. There was a Magistrate Court hearing on
Pinochet, and even Mrs. Thatcher was making public speeches against
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extradition. Against the expectations of many, a relatively conservative
magistrate wrote a short opinion upholding extradition and affirming that the
developing norms of human rights increasingly point towards one law, one
rule of justice, for one world. 7
So, how hard can it be to go and find our own moral compass and to point
ourselves in a direction? Recognizing that, with some humility-a commodity
that lawyers are kind of short on (we're litigators: we tend to be a massive
blob of ego suspended over a chasm of insecurity, and that makes it bad for
us)-we can make these decisions. These decisions are insulated from public
criticism largely because we have these formal rules of which I speak that
enhance our responsibility to talk amongst ourselves and make sure that they
are right. It's simply that we have to keep in touch with the real world in
which our clients live. A lawyer who never goes to court is never put to sea.
We have to make sure that we are not, by virtue of doing these same things
over and over again, falling into some kind of routine-that we keep alert to
these things. I personally like the words of Yeats, "Too long a sacrifice can
make a stone of the heart." That, of course, is something about which we
need to worry and be concerned, but I am here today simply to invite you to
join with those people in our profession who I've mentioned, who I've already
met here, who I know from among your faculty, in the process of defining our
roles. Our role is as the people-the only people-our clients can look to.
And therefore, because we're the guardians of the doors to that place where
our clients can claim to participate with justice, we have to understand what
ethics really means.

37. The magistrate ruled that Pinochet should be held until the Secretary of State
determined whether he should be extradited to Spain. Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, exparte the Kingdom of Belgium, No. CO 236/2000, 2000 WL 486 (Q.B. Div'l
Ct. Feb. 15, 2000). The Secretary of State has since allowed Pinochet to return to Chile, where
he may face prosecution. Attorney General Janet Reno has authorized an American grand jury
inquiry into Pinochet's possible role in the Letelier-Moffit murders.

